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At What Cost?: 
 
Spanish Neutrality in the First World War 
 
Carolyn S. Lowry 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 While historians have gone to great efforts in studying the belligerent powers 
during the First World War, very little attention has been paid to such neutral powers as 
Spain. Several European nations declared neutrality in 1914, but many strayed from this 
course in favor of active belligerence. Spain, however, remained neutral for the war’s 
duration; thus, this thesis examines and explores the nature of Spanish neutrality during 
the First World War.  
 Spain’s decision to adhere to a neutral policy required serious consideration as it 
had to weigh the consequences and advantages of intervention; however, military and 
economic weakness, as well as diplomatic isolation pushed Spain towards neutrality. 
Some hoped by abstaining from involvement, their country would emerge at the war’s 
end as the arbiter of peace, enabling Spain to regain prestige and reestablish itself as a 
major continental power. However, neutrality proved to be a difficult undertaking 
because Spain could not escape the hardships and effects of a continental war. As 
domestic crises enveloped the country, a divided public aligned itself into Francophiles 
and Germanophiles. Escalating domestic issues became exacerbated by diplomatic 
conflicts resulting from the German submarine warfare campaign, which challenged 
Spain’s neutrality policy.  
 iii
 Thus, Spain found itself in a precarious position during the war. While 
recognizing the necessity to maintain neutrality, it suffered serious consequences for its 
decision. It did not emerge from the war as an arbiter of peace, but suffered diplomatic 
humiliation over its failure to overcome the German submarine threat. The government’s 
focus on foreign policy led its leaders to ignore the growing domestic discontent, which 
further destabilized an already unsteady government. As a result, governments rose and 
fell as all proved incapable of resolving Spain’s ever-increasing problems.  
 The case of Spain in the First World War demonstrates that neutrality is not 
necessarily the safe course that many believe, as no country can fully escape the effects 
of war. As a neutral, Spain faced incredible difficulties. The government’s neutrality 
policy kept Spain out of the war, but the regime faced the significant consequences of this 
decision including its ultimate demise. 
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Introduction 
 
Neutrality is not impartiality.1 
 
 What is neutrality? For some, it is a sign of cowardice, a perceived unwillingness 
for a nation to take a stand against right and wrong. For others, neutrality represents the 
ability of a nation to transcend the historic barbarities of war in favor of a more 
enlightened, civilized method of diplomacy. However, regardless of an individual’s 
personal views on the policy of neutrality, it is a significant decision made by a nation to 
abstain from conflict. Merriam-Webster defines neutral as “not favoring either side in a 
quarrel, contest, or war.”2 Thus, neutrality is not a simple decision to avoid involvement; 
rather, it is a calculated choice made by a government to remain uninvolved militarily, as 
well as avoid any semblance of favoritism to either party. In spite of this, as writer 
Hermógenes Cenamor related, “Neutrality is not impartiality.” He further explained that a 
neutral nation:  
is able to be divided in its opinions of the war, according to the passions and interests of the 
political parties. It is inevitable that a neutral state and the nation it represents have an opinion 
about the war and the result of neutrality is always benevolence or hostility to one of the 
belligerents.3  
Neutrality can create the same divisions as war. As a nation embarks on a neutral policy, 
it is virtually impossible to eliminate or disregard the passions that emerge on both sides. 
                                                 
1 Hermógenes Cenamor, Los intereses materiales de España en la guerra europea (Madrid: Librería de la 
Vuida de Pueyo, 1916), 163. 
2 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. “neutral.” 
3 Cenamor, Los intereses materiales de España, 163-164. 
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While these preferences do exist, the purpose of the government is ultimately to set 
personal views aside in order to follow the best course of action for the country.  
Therefore, while the declaration of war is a monumental decision, the choice to remain 
neutral brings with it significant diplomatic and domestic consequences as was the case 
with Spain during World War I. 
The First World War wreaked havoc throughout the world as fighting exploded 
on three continents and the great powers converged in a conflict that would leave millions 
dead and wounded, four empires destroyed, and the world attempting to cope with the 
horrors of 1914-1918. The impact of the war upon the belligerents is apparent. Britain 
and France faced complete devastation at the war’s end as they wrestled with countless 
losses and economic ruin. Yet, they were the victors. Russia dissolved into revolution in 
1917 and the defeated powers — Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey — saw their 
previous influence dissipate. Even the smaller powers such as Italy, Romania, and 
Bulgaria faced tremendous hardships as a result of the war. 
However, while one expects adversity in war, the First World War left no nation 
untouched, and even the neutral powers did not escape unscathed, particularly Spain. The 
case of Spain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows the ultimate demise of one 
of Europe’s greatest empires. While Spain had dominated the continent in earlier 
centuries, its great empire fell far behind as the world expanded through industrialization 
and further imperial conquest. The sluggish pace of its industrial progress left Spain 
economically backward, and the country suffered a devastating blow to its position with 
the loss of its overseas colonies after the 1898 Spanish-American War. Still reeling from 
these circumstances at the outbreak of the war, Spain was in a fragile position. In fact, 
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Turkey, which faced similar circumstances, was often called the “Sick Man of Europe.” 
One Spanish journalist recognized the dangerous parallel and questioned whether Spain 
was not the “Turkey of the West.”4  
When war erupted in 1914, the Spanish government analyzed the possible 
consequences of intervention. Recognizing the seemingly insurmountable obstacles, 
Spain’s leaders realized the country was in no position to become involved in a European 
conflict and believed that their lack of participation in the war could ultimately yield a 
positive outcome for the struggling nation. As a result, the government immediately 
declared the country’s absolute neutrality, throwing Spain into a four-year diplomatic 
roller coaster. Unlike its neutral counterparts such as Italy, Romania and Bulgaria, it 
avoided active belligerence in the conflict and maintained its neutrality policy for the 
war’s duration.   
Despite its neutrality, Spain hardly eluded the consequences of war. While the 
government prevented Spain from entering the war, it could not prevent the war from 
entering Spain as the nation faced the same economic hardships of the belligerents. While 
it did experience some economic growth by taking advantage of the great powers’ 
inability to export, food shortages and a lack of basic necessities created turmoil and 
discontent throughout the country. Already economically deficient at the war’s outbreak, 
the difficulties introduced by such a widespread conflict furthered the deteriorating 
conditions within Spain. 
                                                 
4 Luis Araquistain in España, 2 November 1916, in M. Carmen García-Nieto and Esperanza Yllán 
Calderón, Crisis social y dictadura, 1914-1930, vol. 4 of Historia de España 1808-1978 (Barcelona: 
Editorial Crítica, 1989), 51-52. 
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Exacerbating these economic hardships was Germany’s unrestricted submarine 
warfare campaign that ravaged Spanish shipping producing a dangerous diplomatic 
situation that nearly drew the nation into war. As the war progressed, Spanish society 
divided itself into two factions — francófilos and germanófilos. The destruction caused at 
the hands of German submarines furthered this divide as the nation struggled with the 
prospect of entering the war. With the Germanophiles staunchly supporting strict 
neutrality and the Francophiles demanding at least benevolent neutrality favoring the 
Entente, the Spanish government was in an impossible situation.  
As the submarine campaign affected Spain’s economy and international standing, 
the government wrestled with how to handle its ever-increasing problems. For four years, 
the Restoration monarchy, already rooted in instability, struggled to maintain the 
hegemonic control it held over the country, and the consequences of war only intensified 
their seeming demise. Governments rose and fell as none proved capable of addressing 
the serious crises emerging in Spain. However, despite the rising costs, both domestic and 
diplomatic, the leaders of Spain maintained the policy of neutrality until the war’s end in 
1918. 
Although this course of action was not without its consequences, Spain’s leaders 
had little choice, given Spain’s inherent instability. Despite the constant pressures to 
abandon the neutrality policy, doing so could have proved even more devastating as both 
the Central Powers and the Entente posed formidable threats should Spain have chosen to 
become involved in the conflict. Author on European neutrality, Efraim Karsh related, 
“Not only is neutrality not ‘blessed’ with the traits associated with it – but the successful 
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pursuit of this policy requires the most finely tuned foreign policy instruments.”5 Thus, 
while the policies and actions of Spain’s leaders in 1914-1918 have been rightfully 
scrutinized and criticized, one cannot ignore the diplomatic endurance required to 
maintain this course in the face of such extreme hardship. The results of this policy can 
hardly be described as successful and the conduct of Spain’s leaders often appeared more 
cowardly than diplomatically sound. However, as King Alfonso XIII of Spain explained 
in 1917, “Each of us in his own sphere must do his duty for the well-being and honor of 
Spain.”6 
 
                                                 
5 Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and the Small States (London: Routledge, 1988), 32. 
6 King Alfonso XIII in Sir Charles Petrie, King Alfonso XIII and His Age (London: Chapman & Hall Ltd., 
1963), 127. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Roots of Instability 
 
The tragedy of Spanish public life is the absolute absence of passion, the indifference, the 
shrinking of shoulders with an uncivil “what is it to me.”1 
 
 Spain’s government during the First World War had its roots in instability, which 
would only be exacerbated in the crises that developed from the war. Antonio Cánovas de 
Castillo was the architect of the Restoration Monarchy with Alfonso XII (1875-1885) and 
established its constitution in 1876. He argued that, “This is the only way to form the 
mold a dynasty needs in order to have a solid monarchical institution.”2 He determined 
that a stable Spanish government must consist of a two-party system in which a Liberal 
and Conservative party alternated in power. Along with Liberal leader Práxedes Mateo 
Sagasta, Castillo crafted the turno pacífico (the peaceful rotation).3  
The Restoration’s early years were marked by repressive measures intended to 
regain control lost following years of revolts and revolutions. They limited voting rights 
to only landowners and capacidades, those with high levels of education or academic 
titles.4 However, to maintain the political order, the government realized the need to 
convey authenticity in the voting system. Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
the government instituted more liberal reforms such as relaxed censorship laws and male 
suffrage in 1890. These changes created the false appearance of Spain as one of the more 
                                                 
1 Luis Araquistain, Entre la guerra y la revolucion (Madrid: 1917), 144. 
2 M. Carmen García-Nieto and Esperanza Yllán Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 1874-
1914, vol. 3 of Historia de España 1808-1978 (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1989), 16. 
3 Raymond Carr, ed., Spain: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 223. 
4 García-Nieto and Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 17. 
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democratic European nations. But these devices only served to conceal the monopoly of 
power enjoyed by the governing elite. In fact, this “Restoration” was founded through the 
manipulation of the very democratic ideals they had purportedly established. In reality, 
the government functioned only through the rigging of elections known as caciquismo.5  
The caciquismo achieved the desired election results by manipulating the 
Ministerio de la Gobernación (Ministry of the Interior), which ensured the turno 
continued unabated. The heart of the caciquismo were the caciques, landowners, 
officials, moneylenders, lawyers, priests or other people of local authority, who formed 
the backbone of the Spanish political structure.6 They possessed unlimited powers in their 
respective areas and established a clientelist network that guaranteed the necessary results 
to maintain the turno. Valentí Almirall, a Catalan political activist spoke out against this 
system in his book, Espagne telle qu’elle est (Spain Such as It Is). “If we wanted to list 
all the forms of fraud used in Spain to overturn universal male suffrage or limit it to the 
whims of the government, we would never finish.” He expanded upon this by saying, “I 
have seen many times that my father, in spite of having died years ago, has gone to place 
his ballot in the box under the watchful eye of a city official or a policeman dressed in a 
borrowed suit.”7 Yet despite this corruption, the Restoration continued to function 
because of the apathy of the people. Almirall proved to be the exception as the majority 
of Spaniards allowed themselves to be controlled and manipulated by the caciques.  
This caciquismo political structure dominated Spain until the latter part of the war 
                                                 
5 José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds., Spanish History Since 1808 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 91. 
6 Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918: Between War and Revolution (London: Routledge, 
1999), 2. 
7 Valentí Almirall, Espagne telle que’elle est (Paris: Albert Savine, 1887), 141-52 as quoted in Jon Cowans, 
ed., Modern Spain: A Documentary History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 71-73. 
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and played a key role in the maintenance of the Restoration regime. It was, however, 
judged by other countries as a major hindrance to Spain’s future. In an article written 
during the war, American political scientist Charles H. Cunningham stated: 
Although the cost of necessities of life has reached almost unsupportable proportions and the 
coasts of Spain are blockaded by the German submarines… these facts have had little effect in 
giving to the average Spaniard any definite point of view or attitude toward the great struggle. He 
thinks little about the actualities of the situation, but leaves the entire solution of the matter to the 
‘government,’ in which, evidently, he has no part.8 
These thoughts were echoed by a Spanish journalist who wrote to a French colleague, 
“Believe me, political apathy continues to dominate Spain…. Even in raising the famous 
spectre of war, the professionals will not succeed in awakening political life in Spain.”9  
 Relying upon this apathy, the Restoration functioned fairly smoothly for twenty-
five years, until a crisis emerged that raised doubts about its government’s effectiveness. 
In 1897, Castillo died and the Spanish-American War immediately followed in 1898 
resulting in the disastrous loss of its remaining American and Asian colonies, including 
Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam. El Desastre came as a shock to the 
Spanish, whose national culture maintained the illusion that the world still considered 
Spain at least a middle-ranking world power. However, this significant imperial defeat 
occurred at a peak in Europe’s “New Imperialism” when a nation’s status as a world 
power depended largely upon colonial possessions.  Thus, Spaniards faced the realization 
                                                 
8 Charles H. Cunningham, “Spain and the War,” The American Political Science Review 11, no. 3 (August 
1917): 422. 
9 Gerald Meaker, “A Civil War of Words: The Ideological Impact of the First World War on Spain, 1914-
1918,” in Neutral Europe between War and Revolution, 1917-23, ed. Hans A. Schmitt (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 1988), 7. 
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that according to some nations Spain was, as Lord Salisbury called it, a “dying nation.”10 
Conservative leader, Francisco Silvela echoed Lord Salisbury’s words in an article 
entitled, “Sin Pulso” (Without a Pulse) in which he wrote of the end of Spain’s “destiny 
as a European people.”11 As Salisbury and Silvela’s words echoed through the Spanish 
press and the illusion of world status shattered, segments of the Spanish population began 
to question their political system, as well as their nationhood. One weekly magazine 
wrote, “Today the question for us, not the main but the only and exclusive question, is 
one of life or death; one of whether we continue to exist as a nation or not.”12  
Following El Desastre, an outcry arose from the cultural elites of Spain —writers, 
poets, philosophers —who became known as the Generation of ’98. They attacked the 
ruling regime and denounced the Restoration as the primary cause of Spain’s problems, 
lashing out against the caciquismo, industrial and economic backwardness, clericalism 
and the decline of their society.13 Many Spaniards blamed the government for involving 
the nation in what they perceived to be a “terrible and perhaps unequal struggle.”14 
Silvela recognized the changing perceptions toward the government leaders and admitted 
that they had failed the population. He expressed:  
The failure of the governing classes has been tremendous and a consequence of it is all that so-
called regionalism, which is merely the weakness of the cerebral centre,… and the collapse of the 
                                                 
10 Rosario de la Torre del Río, “La prensa madrileña y el discurso de Lord Salisbury sobre ‘las naciones 
moribundas’ (Londres, Albert Hall, 4 mayo 1898),” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea, no. 
6 (1985): 163-180. 
11 El Tiempo, 16 August 1898, as quoted in Francisco Silvela, Artículos, Discursos, Conferencias y Cartas 
vol. 2  (Madrid: Mateu Artes Gráficas, 1922-1923), 493-498.  
12 “Sed fuertes,” La Ilustración Española y Americana, 8 February 1899, as quoted in Sebastian Balfour, 
The End of the Spanish Empire, 1898-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 50. 
13 Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain, 21. 
14 La Epoca, 10 May 1898, as quoted in Torre del Río, “La prensa madrileña,” 174. 
 10
respect of the people towards their governing classes.15  
Although the 1898 disaster caused some Spaniards to lose faith in the Restoration, 
the regime remained intact primarily due to the lack of a viable alternative. Class and 
regional divisions deepened when Spain lost its colonies, which had been the only major 
factor unifying the country. This division produced an identity crisis that destroyed the 
complacent nationalism encouraged by the government during the war with the United 
States.16 Without any consensus as to how to change the government, the turno remained, 
for the most part, intact. 
 The status quo, however, did not remain completely unchanged. The 1898 defeat 
and the resulting uncertainty led to the establishment of new political parties outside the 
turno’s Conservative and Liberal factions. Of primary importance was the establishment 
of the Lliga Regionalista in 1901, the party of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie. Led by 
Francisco Cambó, the Lliga was a socially conservative group that sought a decentralized 
political system with Catalan political intervention, which they hoped would win 
Catalonian autonomy while benefiting Spain as a whole.17 
 The rise of the Catalan movement was accompanied by the rise of a Left-wing 
Republican party, the Radicals. Alejandro Lerroux, a young journalist, led the Radicals 
against the repressive Restoration regime:  
This whole gigantic project is opposed by tradition, routine, entrenched privileges, conservative 
interests, caciquismo, clericalism, entailed estates, centralism, and the stupid collection of parties 
and programs made up by empty heads in the machines that fabricate religious dogma and 
                                                 
15 Francisco Silvela as quoted in Balfour, The End of the Spanish Empire, 61. 
16 Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, eds., Spanish Cultural Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
28-29. 
17 Charles E. Enrlich, “The Lliga Regionalista and the Catalan Industrial Bourgeoisie,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 33, no. 3 (July 1998): 400-401 and Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain, 22. 
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political despotism.18 
Lerroux urged violence at every opportunity, and his desire to overthrow the rich gained 
him much support from the lower-middle classes, especially in the cities. This increasing 
support culminated in the Radicals’ defeat of the Lliga in the elections of 1903.19  
 The Radicals were by no means the only political group expanding at the turn of 
the century. The Spanish labor movement assumed a more organized form, developing 
into two opposing regional blocs. Castilla, Asturias and the Basque Country had Socialist 
tendencies, while Cataluña, Valencia, Aragón and Andalucía leaned towards Anarcho-
Syndicalism. The growth of Socialism in Spain was much slower than its Anarcho-
Syndicalist counterparts. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) was established in 1879 
followed by the trade union, La Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), in 1888. The 
PSOE, under the leadership of Pablo Iglesias adopted the rhetoric of revolution and the 
rise of the proletariat, blaming the humiliating 1898 defeat on the bourgeoisie political 
leaders who:  
did not take into account the immense economic power of that nation; they did not realize that 
wealth is today what gives a nation strength and energy, and they now confront, and make us 
confront, all the consequences of such tremendous stupidity.20  
While proclaiming themselves as revolutionaries, in practice, they actually focused more 
on the daily struggles of the worker. This contradiction between their ideology and their 
daily actions produced an inability to realize or address the major issues, such as retarded 
                                                 
18 Alejandro Lerroux, De la lucha: Páginas de Alejandro Lerroux (Barcelona: F. Granada, 1909), 119-20 as 
quoted in Cowans, Modern Spain, 103-104. 
19 Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 30. 
20 Pablo Iglesia, “Our Bourgeoisie,” El Socialista, 17 August 1898, as quoted in Cowans, Modern Spain, 
97-98. 
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agricultural development and regional diversity.21 
 As the PSOE-UGT struggled to establish itself, the Anarcho-Syndicalists gained 
surprising support from a wide range of groups, from peasants to Catalan workers. Its 
foundation rested upon a distrust of the state and a call to action to remedy the problems 
plaguing Spain. In 1911, the Anarchists organized a new trade union, the Conferderación 
Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), with the Anarcho-Syndicalists representing the group’s 
most authentic revolutionaries.22 However, the union of these two groups was by no 
means the preferred method of revolutionary development. Rather, governmental 
repression forced the Anarchists and Syndicalists to unite into one union guaranteeing the 
movement would be plagued by internal divisions.23 
 These rising new parties brought fresh perspectives into Spanish politics and the 
government’s ultimate inability to integrate these groups into the existing order would be 
a significant destabilizing force within the turno.24 These groups successfully managed to 
politically awaken and enlighten portions of the Spanish population. However, these were 
not the only forces undermining the Spanish government.  
The deaths of Castillo in 1897 and Sagasta in 1903 left a huge void in the turno, 
which forced the Conservative and Liberal parties to re-examine their leadership 
techniques to counter the rising threat of the new parties. Although each instituted 
reforms, their politics were no longer compatible and the compromise that maintained the 
                                                 
21 P. Heywood, Marxism and the Failure of Organized Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 2-3 and F. Pérez Ledesma, El pensamiento socialista español a 
comienzos de siglo (Madrid: Centro, 1974), pp. 27-34 as found in Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain, 25. 
22 Gerald Meaker, “Anarchists versus Syndicalists: Conflicts within the Conferderación Nacional del 
Trabajo, 1917-1923,” in Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century Spain, ed. Stanley G. Payne (New York: 
Franklin Watts, 1976), 34. 
23 Raymond Carr, Spain, 1808-1939, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 446. 
24 García-Nieto and Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 29. 
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turno since 1876 was no longer possible.  
Intensifying this situation was King Alfonso’s involvement in Spanish politics by 
dissolving and reorganizing the government at will. The ascension of Alfonso XIII to the 
throne in 1902 ushered in a monarchy that intervened directly in politics. Even Winston 
Churchill recognized this unique characteristic in this king. “But I shall not shrink from 
pronouncing now that Alfonso XIII was a cool, determined politician who used 
continuously and in full the whole influence of his kingly office to control the policies 
and fortunes of his country.”25 
 In 1903, Antonio Maura became the leader of the Conservative party and served 
as Premier from 1903-1904 and during his ‘long government’ of 1907-1909. A former 
Liberal who abandoned Sagasta’s party because of internal conflicts, Maura’s main goal 
was to eliminate the caciquismo, which he considered the major impediment to 
maintaining the regime. He believed that the existence of the caciquismo, which 
prevented the people from political involvement, would lead to revolution from below. 
Therefore, he hoped to create a revolution from above to prevent the latter.26 He 
announced his intentions earlier in a speech to Congress in July 1899 that, “It is a 
conviction of all of us that Spain has to go through a revolution; if we do not make it 
here, it will be made in the streets.”27 However, Maura encountered stiff opposition from 
both internal and external forces.  
At the same time, the Liberal party had also attempted to revise the faltering 
                                                 
25 Winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries, (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1937; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1973), 216. 
26 Junco and Shubert, Spanish History Since 1808, 102. 
27 Revista Nacional, nos. 7 and 8, 9 July 1899, 129 as quoted in Balfour, The End of the Spanish Empire, 
188. 
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system, but both parties suffered enormously from internal conflicts, as well as their 
determined opposition to each other. As conflicts deepened, the government’s inability to 
address the rising strength of the workers’ movement culminated in a crisis during the 
‘Tragic Week’ in the summer of 1909.28  
Morocco remained the last imperial Spanish holding, which it vowed to defend at 
all cost. After the 1898 Spanish-American War, it could not afford the devastating blow 
to its international prestige and national pride that the loss of its portion of Morocco 
would cause. Prior to war with the United States, Spain still maintained a significant 
imperial presence in the Caribbean and Pacific with control of Cuba, the Philippines, 
Puerto Rico and Guam. However, Spain’s crushing defeat forced the country to 
relinquish these colonies to the United States. This loss meant that Spain’s last 
noteworthy territory was Morocco, which could not be surrendered.   
In addition, losing its hold in Morocco would potentially affect Spain’s national 
security. Liberal leader Montero Ríos clearly related these fears when he asked: 
Does the Government of His Majesty bear in mind that if the North West of Morocco comes under 
the domination…of a military or civil Protectorate of France, Spain would be reduced to seeing 
herself besieged perpetually in the North and South by the same power?29 
Due to its close geographical proximity, Spain emphasized its obvious interest in 
Moroccan affairs and viewed any British or French infringement on these affairs as a 
threat. Thus, France’s increasing presence in the Morocco ushered in the possibility of 
French encirclement that could ultimately push Spain out of its last imperial holding 
                                                 
28 García-Nieto and Calderón, Teoría y práctica del parlamentarismo, 41. 
29 Montero Ríos quoted in Maura Gamazo, La Cuestíon de Marruecos desde el punta de vista España 
(Madrid 1905), 33-34 as found in James A. Chandler, “Spain and Her Moroccan Protectorate 1898-1927,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 10, n. 2 (April 1975): 302. 
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furthering the nation’s insistence on maintaining its portion.  
Following a summer 1909 uprising in the Moroccan Protectorate, army reservists 
were called up in Madrid and Barcelona. On 26 July, bloody riots ensued among the 
urban workers launching the Semana Tragica (Tragic Week). Although more an attack 
against the general workers’ conditions, “conscription for service in a colonial war was 
nevertheless a grievance sufficient to act as a catalyst to violence.”30  
Severe repression followed the crisis as Maura dealt harshly with those 
responsible for the protest. Although supported by a majority in the Cortes, Alfonso XIII 
chose to dismiss Maura because he felt the politician’s unpopularity could potentially 
undermine the monarchy. As the government fell, the turno faced a serious threat. Maura 
was the first and last politician to have a genuine mass following, and his dismissal 
resulted in some young Conservatives following Maura in creating a separate Maurista 
movement causing the first serious split in one of the two dynastic parties.  
Thus, as the tides of war began to embroil the continent, the Spanish government 
entered into a period of chaos. From the ascension of Alfonso XIII in 1902 until Primo de 
Rivera’s coup d’etat in 1923, there were thirty-three Spanish governments. As war 
erupted in 1914, the Restoration government, already unstable and facing a wide array of 
new domestic threats, recognized that if it had any hope of preventing its further demise, 
its only option with regard to the developing international conflict was the path of 
neutrality. 
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Chapter Two 
 
“Observer Neutralidad Más Absoluta” 
 
“Spain remains and will remain neutral because this is her firm will.”1 
 
 No one realized the devastation that would result from the hostilities that 
commenced in the summer of 1914. As Europe quickly divided into opposing blocs, the 
Spanish government firmly believed it should not involve itself in a general European 
war, regardless of the prevailing ‘short war illusion.’ Thus, when hostilities broke out, 
Conservative Prime Minister Eduardo Dato officially declared his country’s neutrality on 
30 July.  
With great misfortune, war was declared between Germany, on the one side, and Russia, France 
and the United Kingdom, while a state of war also exists between Austria-Hungary and Belgium. 
The government of your majesty believes it should order the strictest neutrality (más estricta 
neutralidad) of Spanish subjects.2 
In a telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Belgium on 4 August 1914, Foreign 
Minister, Marqués de Lema, reinforced Spain’s intention to “observer neutralidad más 
absoluta.”3 Thus, the Spanish government did not hesitate in declaring its policy relative 
to the growing conflict and would maintain this assurance for the next four years. 
Several factors contributed to the Spanish government’s policy of neutrality, 
extending from its lack of military power to its ultimate goal to regain lost prestige by 
                                                 
1 Count Conde de Romanones in Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918, 62. 
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serving as the arbiter of peace at the war’s end. However, as adamant as Spain’s 
politicians were regarding neutrality, it was by no means an easy decision. It involved 
serious contemplation as they recognized the potential consequences. Thus, the Spanish 
government carefully weighed its options and determined neutrality was the best, and 
only, course of action for the struggling nation. It would adhere to the decision despite 
numerous diplomatic and domestic threats and challenges. Prime Minister Dato outlined 
the reasoning for this course of action in a letter to his former chief Maura dated 25 
August 1914: 
We would depart from neutrality only if we were directly threatened by foreign aggression or by 
an ultimatum…. Germany and Austria are delighted with our attitude as they believe us 
compromised with the Entente. France and Britain cannot criticize us as our pacts with them are 
limited to Morocco…. I do not fear that the Allies would push us to take sides with or against 
them…. They must know that we lack material resources and adequate preparation for a modern 
war…. Would not we render a better service to both sides by sticking to our neutrality so that one 
day we could raise a white flag and organize a peace conference in our country which could put an 
end to the current conflict? We have moral authority for that and who knows if we shall be 
required to do so.4 
After the Dato-led government made the decision to remain neutral in the growing 
conflict, many held Dato’s optimistic views regarding the benefits this policy could bring 
Spain. They looked forward to reaping the rewards of avoiding war and hoped to advance 
Spain’s position. As Dato conveyed, there were numerous reasons for Spain to pursue 
this policy. 
One of the primary reasons, as mentioned, was its drastically inferior military 
                                                 
4 Eduardo Dato quoted in Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, eds., Spain and the Great Powers in the 
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capability. The Spanish-American War decimated the military. Naval operations in the 
Philippines and Cuba destroyed the Spanish squadrons in both areas. In addition, in the 
1890s, commencing with the initial uprisings in Cuba and culminating in the 1898 defeat, 
the Spanish army suffered nearly 200,000 casualties, not in battle, but as a result of its 
inadequate medical corps.5 By 1910, its army had only 80,000 soldiers and 25,000 
officers, or a ratio of one officer for every five soldiers.6 Not only was the army small, 
but the disproportionately large number of officers prohibited any major reform of the 
armed forces. Furthermore, the government devoted approximately forty percent of its 
budget to defense, with an astounding seventy percent of the defense budget appropriated 
for officers’ salaries.7 While the officer corps naturally defied any attempts to change this 
established system, the political leaders also chose not to make any significant changes 
because the army symbolized stability for its government.8 Thus, modernization of the 
armed forces proved virtually impossible.  
In addition to these structural and financial problems within the army, there was 
dissension within the army that stemmed from colonial conflict in Morocco and the issue 
of combat merits. On the eve of the First World War, Spain was in the midst of the 
Moroccan War (1909-1927) hoping to maintain the country’s last imperial holding, but 
occupying over half of the country’s inadequately trained troops in the process.9 In 
addition, the conflict created discord between peninsulares (those who served in Spain) 
                                                 
5 Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918, 56. 
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and Africanistas (those who served in Morocco), as the army reintroduced méritos de 
guerra (war/combat merits) in 1910 after they were abolished following abuse during the 
1898 war. 10 These merits obviously benefited the Africanistas considering they faced 
actual combat in Morocco. This further divided the officer corps as a debate ensued 
between seniority versus battlefield promotions. Already a problem at the outbreak of the 
war, it would reach a critical point in 1917. With its military divided and no financial 
means to increase either land or sea forces, Spain could not provide even minimal 
military assistance to the belligerents. 
 Closely related to the army’s difficulties was Spain’s general economic weakness 
in 1914. The origin could be traced back to the policies instituted by the Restoration 
government at the end of the nineteenth century that ultimately isolated Spain from the 
international economy and impeded its own economic expansion. Prior to 1868, the 
country had utilized a bimetallic standard with an overvaluation of silver.11 In 1883, 
Spain suspended the convertibility of gold and refused to adhere to the gold standard used 
by the majority of European nations. Spain’s failure isolated it from the international 
economy and resulted in a greater fluctuation of the exchange rate for its peseta. This led 
to the slow, continuous drop in its value between 1890 and 1896 with no sign of change 
until 1900.12 Another factor in Spain’s economic weakness resulted from their severe 
dependence upon tariffs. As the rest of Europe established a world market for grain, made 
possible by transportation advances from the Industrial Revolution, Spain reverted to a 
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protectionist stance to counter the threat of foreign wheat and other goods. However, 
Spain’s archaic agricultural system and the flood of Soviet and U.S. grain into the world 
market devastated the Spanish economy. 
The instability of the Spanish economy and its isolation from the world economy 
created significant problems, including “one of the lowest rates of industrialization in 
Western Europe.”13 Spain did not enter the second stage of industrialization until the 
1920s, and it has been argued that “the case of Spain is less that of a latecomer than that 
of an attempt, largely thwarted, to join the ranks of the first comers.”14 In 1910, two-
thirds of the population still worked in agriculture, which accounted for approximately 
one-third of the gross domestic product. Agricultural backwardness and inadequate 
farming practices produced an unstable economy that fluctuated between prosperity and 
crisis, greatly retarding Spain’s industrial growth. Urban centers were generally small, as 
only ten percent of the population lived in cities with a population over 100,000. 
Illiteracy rates were extremely high with thirty-seven percent of men and fifty-eight 
percent of women falling into that category. Although Spain finally saw improved growth 
and slow structural changes in its economy after 1910, they had made little impact by the 
outbreak of the war.15  
 In addition to military and economic weakness, a two-fold reason for Spain’s 
declaration of neutrality was that the European dispute did not affect Spanish interests 
and that it was too isolated politically and diplomatically. Jerónimo Bécker’s 1924 study 
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of foreign policy begins “The dawning of the nineteenth century was a sad day for 
Spain.”16 The loss of its long-standing imperial empire and growing political instability, 
social conflict and economic backwardness placed Spain in a tenuous situation, and its 
foreign policy reflected this weakness.  
Upon ascending the throne in 1902, Alfonso XIII was determined to play a key 
role in Spain’s foreign policy. His first political move was the selection of his bride. The 
Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Britain, 
France and Russia) believed that his choice would largely determine his diplomatic 
policy relative to these alliances. Because his mother, Queen Maria Cristina was a 
Habsburg, many thought he would align himself with the Triple Alliance. Yet, Alfonso 
chose Victoria Eugenie of Battenburg, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, bringing 
himself and Spain closer to the Triple Entente in a move that was seen by many as a mark 
of Spain’s rupture with Germany and Alfonso’s Austro-Hungarian ancestry. Alfonso 
firmly believed that Spain’s 1898 defeat resulted from the lack of a permanent alliance, 
and this move represented the king’s initial attempt to establish what he deemed was 
Spain’s most desperate need —allies.17  
As the Great Powers had aligned themselves into opposing blocs, Spain realized it 
must avoid complete diplomatic isolation. For Alfonso, the choice was obvious. Since 
Britain and France surrounded Spain, his foreign policy would be one dictated by 
geography. For London and Paris, on the other hand, Spain posed a potential threat to 
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their fundamental interests. Britain’s main concern involved protecting its lifeline 
through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to India, while France focused on 
defending its southern border in the event of war with Germany. Both nations, united in 
their opposition to expanding German influence, believed Spain could serve as a buffer, 
and therefore favored rapproachment with Spain. However, rapproachment did not come 
easily, as tensions arose when Spain and France clashed over conflicting interests in 
North Africa.  
 By 1900, North Africa had become the key focus in Spain and France’s 
imperialistic ambitions. After its colonial losses in 1898, maintaining its position in North 
Africa became an obsession for Spain. It considered Morocco as its last opportunity to 
retain a sizable colony and restore some of its lost prestige. Contention over the territory 
intensified when Britain and France concluded the Anglo-French Entente in 1904, 
solidifying France’s position in North Africa. The Entente relegated the two powers to 
their respective spheres of influence with France relinquishing its position in the Middle 
East to Britain in exchange for a primary role in Morocco. This bound France to negotiate 
with Spain regarding conditions in Morocco. Britain and France had ignored Spain in the 
treaty negotiations and these North African provisions were not acceptable to Alfonso.18  
Although Spain’s role in North Africa was minimal, both Britain and France, 
because of their own colonial ambitions, believed it was in their best interests to keep 
Spain weak. Their agreement to limit Spanish influence in North Africa particularly 
outraged Alfonso who immediately turned to Germany for support. Germany initially 
expressed interest in forging a relationship with Spain, but it quickly reconsidered for fear 
                                                 
18 Bledsoe, “Spanish Foreign Policy,” 8-10. 
 23
of alienating the British who opposed full French control of Morocco. London would 
seek German assistance, if necessary, to prevent it. Germany’s rebuff forced Alfonso to 
renegotiate with Britain and France, resulting in Spain receiving a significantly decreased 
share of Morocco and Alfonso’s first, but not last, major setback in foreign affairs.  
Morocco would again take center stage in European politics in 1905 and 1911. 
Following consummation of the Anglo-French Entente, Germany decided to test the 
alliance and Europe by instigating the 1905-1906 Moroccan Crisis. Kaiser Wilhelm II 
visited Tangier in March 1905 and announced that he favored Moroccan independence. 
The Germans demanded an international conference, which assembled at Algeciras, but 
delegates from the convening nations voted to support French claims in Morocco. 
Germany again threatened French claims in the region during the 1911 Agadir Crisis 
when a German gunboat arrived in Agadir to protect German interests. It culminated with 
a German offer to abstain from further conflict in Morocco if it could obtain the French 
Congo. The Great Powers again rebuffed the Germans offering some small concessions 
in Africa and the crisis ultimately subsided. Although still maintaining a key interest in 
Moroccan affairs, Spain played a secondary role in the negotiations. It struggled to 
maintain the last remnant of its colonial holdings, but the 1911 Agadir Crisis only 
furthered its humiliation by reducing Spain’s Moroccan territory to 18,300 square miles 
compared to France’s 460,000.19 Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War, Spain was 
surrounded by Britain and France, both determined to keep it weak, while the threat of a 
growing Germany loomed in the distance, making neutrality the only diplomatic option. 
An additional argument for Spain’s neutrality during the war was the potential to 
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regain lost prestige. As mentioned, the 1898 disaster and subsequent failures in foreign 
affairs left Spain struggling to re-establish itself as a dominant continental power. 
Alfonso and the Spanish government hoped that by remaining impartial, they could 
assume a leading role in peace negotiations following the First World War, thereby 
gaining diplomatically what they could not achieve on the battlefield. They could only 
accomplish this by maintaining contact with the contending alliances. Ambassadors to the 
belligerent powers received clear instructions that Spain must “maintain the most 
amicable relations with the different states directly involved in the conflict.”20 
During summer 1914, most Spaniards appeared to support the decision of 
neutrality, initially welcoming it as the only course of action for the country. However, 
dissenting voices soon emerged. The Carlists, a dominant right-wing party, were quick to 
announce their pro-German sentiments, while the Republican Radicals, led by Alejandro 
Lerroux, expressed their support for intervention on behalf of the Entente. However, one 
individual especially stunned the nation with his unorthodox perspective on Spain’s 
position at the outbreak of war. Count Conde de Romanones, leader of the Liberal party, 
voiced his feelings against neutrality in an article published in his newspaper, El Diario 
Universal, entitled “Neutralidades que matan” (‘Fatal neutralities’). The article outlined 
the disadvantages of a neutral policy. Romanones stated: 
‘Neutrality,’ literally means to not be with one or the other. In reality, is Spain really not with one 
or the other? Is it able to allow itself to be with one or the other? ... Spain recently signed a treaty 
with France with respect to Morocco; Spain shares the Pyrenees front with France; all the sea-
lanes are controlled by England. In economic affairs, France maintains the primary role in our 
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imports and exports, followed closely by England. Spain’s economic and geographic destiny then 
lies within the orbit of the Entente…  Thus, Spain is not able to be neutral because reaching this 
decisive moment forces us not to be…  Neutrality unsupported by the neutral’s own force is at the 
mercy of the first strong state which finds it necessary to violate it… If Germany wins, will she 
thank us for our neutrality? No, she will try to rule the Mediterranean. She will not take French 
continental territory… We shall lose our hopes of expansion in Morocco. We shall lose our 
independence… Nor will German expansion in the economic and industrial domain compensate 
us for the ruin of the countries with whom our interests in those respects have been up to now 
identified. On the other hand, if the Allies triumph they will owe us no debt of gratitude and will 
remodel the map of Europe as they think fit… The die is cast and there is no remedy but to 
gamble. Neutrality is not a remedy, but to the contrary, there are fatal neutralities!21  
The article had an incredible impact on the Spanish population and government as 
this dynastic party leader openly criticized government policy. Romanones did not 
necessarily advocate Spain’s entry into the war, but favored benevolent neutrality toward 
the Entente. However, the majority of the population disagreed, and this backlash was 
enough to force Romanones to deny responsibility for the article on 4 September 1914. 
He quickly supported strict neutrality, but the article instilled doubts as to his true 
feelings regarding this policy. Authorship would be debated, but Romanones’s influence 
was not questioned, and he stated in his memoirs “The article was exclusively mine in 
form and inspiration.”22 
 As autumn approached, the prevailing ‘short war illusion’ proved false, leading 
some neutral powers to choose sides. Italy had previously been a member of the Triple 
Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, but chose neutrality at the war’s outbreak. 
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It ultimately abandoned this policy by joining the Entente in 1915 with Romania 
following in 1916. Bulgaria, on the other hand, chose the Central Powers in 1915. Spain 
continued to stress absolute neutrality, but could not escape the effects of the war. Don 
Francisco de Reynoso, Spanish Ambassador to Switzerland during the war years 
commented that:  
looking back on them (the war years) now they seem equally incredible, so fantastic and horrible 
were the things they brought in their wake, - even to the inhabitants of the neutral countries. For 
through the screen of well-guarded frontiers there seeped all the backwash of war.23  
Economic hardships and shortages plagued the continent, and while the Spanish 
population, which experienced high rates of illiteracy, remained indifferent to the 
ideological and political issues that emerged, they were not immune to the economic 
consequences of war. Many social, cultural and political groups recognized the 
ideological differences of democracy versus autocracy between the belligerents and 
began to question the neutrality policy. Thus, neutrality ushered in the expression of the 
varied ideological views of the social classes and political parties in Spain.24 Slowly, the 
population aligned itself in two camps, creating a ‘civil war of words,’ dividing almost 
equally into francófilos and germanófilos. This division extended beyond a mere debate 
between two opposing viewpoints; rather it created an intense division that disrupted 
families, so much so that even cinemas refused to present war news to prevent fights.25 
More importantly, it was an ominous sign of what the future had in store for Spain twenty 
years later. A French journalist visiting Madrid in 1917 was quite prescient in this regard: 
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The fact is that two families of very old passions have been awakened and set in motion by this 
new conflict. And such is the somber fervor that they breathe that if they had troops behind them, I 
ask myself if that civil war of which everyone speaks so much might not become one day a reality 
for Spain [emphasis mine].26  
 While important to examine supporters of the two camps, it is extremely difficult 
to establish arbitrary designations for Germanophiles compared to Francophiles. In 
general, however, the clergy, army, aristocracy, landowning elites, upper bourgeoisie, 
court, Carlists and Mauristas favored the Central Powers. They wanted to maintain the 
existing order and uphold Catholic and traditional values such as monarchism, discipline, 
authority and a hierarchical social order. Germanophiles viewed an Allied victory as a 
potential extension of democratic ideas, and hence a threat to the status quo and their 
hegemonic control of the population. The Francophiles, on the other hand, consisted of 
Regionalists, Republicans, Socialists, professional middle classes and intellectuals, who 
advocated domestic reform. They sought to eradicate the current system’s corruption and 
introduce democracy, and viewed the war as a struggle of democracy against autocracy. 
In other words, the question of choosing sides transcended the question of Britain and 
France versus Germany, and became an ideological struggle of the old order versus a new 
order, rigidity versus change. 
Very few people supported becoming militarily involved in the conflict, which 
meant the question was not so much whether Spain should remain neutral, but rather 
what shape that neutrality should assume. Those favoring the Central Powers emphasized 
absolute neutrality because they realized that Spanish intervention on behalf of the 
Central Powers would be military suicide given Spain’s geographic location. The 
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Francophiles, on the other hand, represented a variety of opinions. The majority favored 
benevolent neutrality toward the Allies because of Spain’s economic and military 
position, while a few called for a diplomatic rupture from Germany. One Francophile, 
Hermógenes Cenamor called the policy “shameful, depressive, anti-patriotic and 
inhuman.”27 In the early stages of the debate, the “old-order” Germanophiles had one 
distinct advantage. They could advocate the official policy of the Spanish government, 
disguising pro-German feelings as patriotism and opposition to foreign interference in 
Spanish affairs. The Francophiles’ position, to the contrary, could be viewed as 
borderline treason.  
As society split into segments, dynastic politicians struggled to maintain the 
appearance of absolute neutrality, but it quickly became evident where their sympathies 
truly lay. While Romanones and many Liberals clearly favored the Western powers, 
some Liberal party members opposed Romanones and supported his rival, the Marquis of 
Alhucemas, and were thus labeled Germanophiles. Within the Conservative party, many 
such as José Sánchez Guerra, Minister of the Interior, and General Ramón Echague, 
Minister of War, were considered supporters of the Central Powers, while Dato and 
Marquis de Lema, his Foreign Minister, were believed to favor the Allies. Despite 
personal divisions, with the exception of Romanones, the dynastic politicians disguised 
their positions by appearing unified relative to neutrality.28 
King Alfonso XIII was perhaps the most important figure in the neutrality debate. 
The war divided his court with the Queen Mother, the Austrian Archduchess María 
Cristina on the one side, who harbored pro-German sentiments, against the king’s wife, 
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Victoria Eugenia, who staunchly defended her British homeland. The Entente assumed 
Alfonso supported their cause, but although Alfonso displayed pro-Allied tendencies, 
overshadowing them was his strong desire to consolidate his power at home and for 
Spain to play a leading role in post-war Europe. From the beginning of his reign, Alfonso 
determined to rejuvenate his country as evidenced in a diary entry dated immediately 
after he assumed the throne: 
I can be a King who will be filled with the glory of having regenerated his country, whose name 
will pass on in history as an imperishable memento of his reign… I hope at the same time to 
revive my country and make her, if not powerful, at least sought for as an ally.29 
Yet, as ardently as Alfonso believed that Spain should remain neutral, he proved more 
than willing to solicit offers from both sides to gain significant advantages.  
When the Spanish government emphatically declared its neutrality in the summer 
of 1914, officials could not anticipate the domestic and diplomatic turmoil that erupted 
over the next four years. The leaders recognized that militarily, economically, and 
diplomatically, Spain was completely unprepared to enter a large-scale conflict. Thus, 
they clearly established their neutrality policy. Even so, the hostilities still had a dramatic 
effect on most segments of society, which the government proved unprepared to handle. 
Thus, King Alfonso and his government’s course of action would be harshly tested. 
Nevertheless, they adhered to their policy regardless of the consequences.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The War Enters Spain 
 
The subversive power of the war, which is sinking emperors, throwing out kings, making 
all the old hierarchies tremble, is now reaching us.1 
 
 As Europe settled into a state of war, Spain settled into an uneasy state of 
neutrality. The government resolved to keep Spain from entering the war, yet this became 
increasingly difficult due to the pressure to choose a side in the conflict. This pressure 
launched Spain into a four-year diplomatic struggle, in their effort to maintain relations 
with the belligerent powers. While neutrality kept Spain out of the war, it could not 
escape the economic consequences of a general European conflict. Domestic crises and 
poor diplomatic maneuvering created a tenuous situation for Spain and brought it to the 
brink of war. 
Germany had a significant diplomatic advantage compared to the Entente in its 
relationship with Spain, especially during the war’s early years. A major factor at the 
onset of the conflict was Germany’s influential presence in the Spanish press, perhaps its 
most effective and sophisticated propaganda effort. The mastermind, Ambassador Prince 
Max von Ratibor, convinced the German Foreign Office to bribe numerous Spanish 
periodicals to present a pro-German viewpoint. In a report issued on 12 October 1914, 
Ratibor argued that the Foreign Office must fund propaganda efforts in Spain, citing a 
report by “a good source” that the French invested 600,000 francs to influence Spanish 
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opinion, and lamenting that the Germans had already lost several important newspapers, 
such as El Liberal, La Correspondencia de España, La Imparcial, and the Herald de 
Madrid.2 In response, the Foreign Office agreed to fund portions of the Spanish press, a 
move welcomed by Ratibor who commented, “I believe that they [papers and newspaper 
workers] will work now for our side with doubled enthusiasm. And also they will 
persuade others to become Germanophiles.”3 He inundated the Spanish press with pro-
German sentiments, in ways unmatched by the Entente, which proved tremendously 
successfully in convincing the population to remain neutral. This German influence grew 
so strong it even led several Spaniards to establish periodicals to oppose the 
Germanophile media and convey pro-Allied perspectives. This included España, one of 
several journals founded by politician Luis Araquistain with the belief that it was 
absolutely necessary to counter the German propaganda threat.4 
Germany also had greater advantages in its diplomatic negotiations than the 
Entente to convince Spain to maintain absolute neutrality, the most helpful course of 
action for Berlin. Since Germany realized an alliance with Spain was impossible because 
of geographic and economic barriers, it could be very generous with territorial promises 
as lands appealing to Spain did not belong to the Central Powers. The Allies, on the 
contrary, found themselves facing a significant predicament. They could either deny 
territorial concessions to Madrid and further German propaganda that Britain and France 
were Spain’s enemies attempting to keep her weak, or they could offer valuable territory 
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in exchange for what they recognized would be insignificant support.  
 As King Alfonso XIII persisted in his foreign policy goals, diplomatic blackmail 
marked his early efforts, whereby he manipulated offers from the European powers to try 
to achieve the best results for Spain. Germany offered several tempting territories to 
Spain, ranging from Gibraltar and Tangier to control of Portugal and French Morocco. 
Alfonso responded by approaching the Entente to solicit a counteroffer. While the Allies 
remained open to negotiations, they did not intend to promise concessions without the 
guarantee of a significant return. A conversation between Alfonso and a French official 
states: 
His Majesty expressed friendly sentiments but said that he was in a difficult position between the 
Germans, who were supported by the Spanish Right and who offered him Gibraltar, Morocco and 
a free hand in Portugal, and the Allies who seemed not to feel gratitude for the services which he 
had rendered them. The King refrained from stating what he expected from the Allies, but 
Monsieur Cooreman derived the impression he had Tangier in mind. His Majesty did not 
apparently mention the nature of the services to which he made allusion…5 
The British realized the benefits of having Spain join the Entente, but they also strongly 
supported Spain’s neutrality as the preferable option because they recognized Spain’s 
limited military capabilities. If Spain joined the Allies, Britain determined its best course 
of action, assuming France agreed, would be to offer Tangier in exchange for its active 
involvement.  
All this changed when Italy joined the Entente in May 1915. While Spain was the 
largest neutral on the continent, Italy’s strategic location made it a far more desirable ally. 
Geographically, the Entente’s close proximity to Spain meant it could be easily coerced 
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economically. Italy, on the other hand, was much closer to the Central Powers 
geographically, potentially making its influence much more decisive. With Italy on its 
side, the Entente no longer needed to pursue an alliance with Spain, which would have 
required the sacrifice of territory more valuable than the minimal assistance that Spain 
would have provided.6  
 While King Alfonso unsuccessfully pursued his foreign policy goals, Prime 
Minister Eduardo Dato and the Spanish government determined their official policy —to 
maintain neutrality. However, this policy would be harshly tested, as it placed the 
government in an extremely precarious position. The country began to crumble as drastic 
social, demographic and economic changes altered the domestic landscape. These harsh 
realities would be exacerbated by a severe diplomatic crisis that pushed neutrality to a 
breaking point.  
Initially, the war presented Spain with tremendous economic opportunities as 
most of Europe shifted to a war economy. Spain, capitalizing on its neutral status, began 
to fill the gaps, not only supplying both sides, but also enjoying new trade outlets, thanks 
to the belligerents’ inability to export. As a result, initially, Spanish industry and 
commerce grew dramatically. The textile, leather goods, mining, iron, shipping and 
chemical industries flourished as the warring powers’ demand rose exponentially. 
Between 1913 and 1918, electrical capacity almost doubled, positively affecting the 
technological base of Spanish industry.7 The significant drop in imports and astounding 
increase in exports produced an economic boom. In 1914, the balance of trade was minus 
                                                 
6 Rubén Domínguez Méndez, “La gran guerra y la neutralidad Española: entre la tradición historiográfica y 
las nuevas líneas de investigación,” Spagna Contemporanea, no. 34, 2008, 35. 
7 Balfour, The End of the Spanish Empire, 211. 
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154 million pesetas, but by 1915 it had expanded to plus 275 million pesetas. Spanish 
gold reserves doubled between 1914 and 1916 from 543 million to one billion thirty-two 
million pesetas in July 1916.8 This tremendous growth stimulated the Spanish banking 
industry, expanding it from fifty banks nationally at the beginning of the war to eighty by 
the end, while the number of accounts quadrupled during the same period.9 
However, this seemingly amazing economic transformation almost destroyed 
Spain. The inability to import basic commodities coupled with unregulated exports and 
the overabundance of currency produced rampant inflation, while skyrocketing prices 
increased the divisions between the rich and poor.  The inflation rate increased from 
106.9 in September 1914 to 123.6 by March 1917, then to 145.4 in March 1918.10 Spain’s 
inadequate infrastructure almost collapsed under the pressure, and while the northern and 
eastern industrial areas thrived, other regions faced devastating unemployment and 
shortages. The war also cut Spanish migration to North America by seventy-five percent, 
which previously served as an important safety valve for rural Spain.11 This created an 
overpopulation of rural areas, forcing many peasants to migrate to major cities such as 
Barcelona and Bilbao. These economic changes brought about by neutrality primarily 
benefited the bourgeoisie and the land-owning elite who experienced a tremendous 
accumulation of wealth. However, while one portion of the population enjoyed a period 
of extreme wealth, the war also brought deteriorating living conditions and shortages of 
basic commodities for the majority, creating an even greater divide among Spain’s social 
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11 Ibid. 
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classes.12 
Eduardo Dato’s government refused to deal with the international and domestic 
crises created by the war and kept the Cortes, the Spanish legislature, closed. Meanwhile, 
Spain desperately required extreme economic reform to facilitate the growing demand 
and production. Although it experienced an economic boom immediately following the 
outbreak of the war, Spain’s slow rate of industrialization rendered it unable to sustain 
production to meet demand. Even the British recognized the hardships in Spain as the 
Ambassador Sir Arthur Hardinge sent reports on the drastically deteriorating situation, 
including difficulties importing wheat and coal, the worsening condition of the Spanish 
railways, and the increasing problems with overall transportation resulting from German 
attacks on marine transport and the ensuing overburdened land transport system.13 
However, even with rampant inflation, the government appeared to be unconcerned about 
the economic problems as many of its leaders were among the few that benefited from 
the war’s economic upheaval. After the initial economic boom and industrial expansion, 
Spain’s sluggish industrialization and inadequate infrastructure prevented further growth, 
leaving much of the population struggling to survive, while the governing elite enjoyed 
unprecedented wealth. “The agricultural oligarchy remained uninterested in the structural 
reform of the country; it, too, benefited from an increase in exports, but it did not wish to 
see its power diminished by the growing urban classes.”14  
The failure to resolve these economic difficulties resulted in the crisis de 
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subsistencias, as the population protested their deteriorating conditions. An Instituto de 
Reformas Sociales report elaborated on the problems faced in Barcelona, including 
transportation difficulties on both land and sea and the subsequent hindrance in the 
import of basic necessities, as well as shortages of construction and industrial materials, 
which primarily affected the middle and working classes.15  The first indications of 
discontent appeared in 1914 when many citizens attacked those suspected of abetting the 
growing crisis. An article in the newspaper El Consejo denounced the rising cost of bread 
in Madrid, arguing that the local bakers were taking advantage of the difficult 
circumstances to fully control and manipulate the price. The article then criticized the 
government officials that allowed such policies. “We cannot understand how they defend 
the interests of an entity that aspires to monopolize the production of bread in Madrid in 
order to impose a price that their egos dictate.”16 The public outcry soon expanded to 
food riots and assaults on shops. The government’s failure to address the increasing 
domestic concerns plaguing the country resulted in Dato’s fall from power in December 
1915. He was replaced by Count Conde de Romanones, leader of the dynastic Liberal 
party, during whose administration, the neutrality policies and Liberal Monarchy would 
be harshly tested. 
Despite previous concerns regarding his position on neutrality, the Spanish 
population initially welcomed the Romanones administration because it promised to 
address the crisis de subsistencias by stimulating the economy to combat shortages, 
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inflation and unemployment. It also focused on agricultural improvements, public credit 
and transport, national defense, the judicial and educational systems and reducing 
expenses in Morocco. However, such lofty and unachievable goals only served to 
demonstrate that the dynastic parties could not adapt to a rapidly changing Spain. As the 
country experienced the rise of mass politics, the turno suffered a decline in popular 
support. While the government attempted unsuccessfully to address the domestic 
problems, an international crisis with Germany emerged, almost destroying the neutrality 
policy. As the government ignored the devastating domestic problems to focus on the 
neutrality issue, it pushed Spain into a chaotic situation, which the leadership proved 
completely unprepared to handle. 
As mentioned, following his Neutralidades que matan article, Romanones found 
it extremely difficult to deny his pro-Allied tendencies. Although still adamantly stressing 
his adherence to the neutrality policy, he secretly determined to establish better relations 
with Britain and France, which he believed provided the only means to strengthen its 
unstable economy and rebuild Spain’s lost empire, with a focus on Northern Africa.17 
However, with the tenuous and ever-deepening hostility between Francophiles and 
Germanophiles, Romanones recognized that he could not take the drastic step of cutting 
off diplomatic relations with Germany. Thus, he could offer the Entente very little in 
terms of support, and much to his dismay, Britain and France did not respond to his 
approaches. In fact, they remained unconvinced that a pro-Allied prime minister could 
yield a more positive outcome. After Dato’s fall, Ambassador Hardinge declared:  
I am not at all sure that a more openly friendly government may be an embarrassment both for 
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Spain and ourselves. Mr. Dato held the balance well, officially and privately he was most friendly. 
Romanones may press for a price and try to raise the questions of Tangier.18 
Romanones did not realize that his diplomatic advances would not only fail to entice the 
Entente, but would trigger a harsh Central Powers attack against his leadership. As a 
result, Spain came dangerously close to abandoning the policy it had so adamantly 
defended. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Neutrality’s Ultimate Test 
 
Silence at present is a crime; for if we wait until the moment of victory to show our 
sympathy for the victor it is probable we shall be too late.1 
 
The circumstances that almost brought Spain into the war involved the sinking of 
Spanish merchant ships by German submarines. Starting as a minor diplomatic matter, 
the situation developed into a major crisis that brought Madrid’s relations with Germany 
to a breaking point. As the war progressed, Spain desperately attempted to grapple with 
the severe economic crisis plaguing the country, and exports were crucial in the attempt 
to keep the Spanish economy afloat. As mentioned, many new outlets emerged for 
Spanish exports, and as a neutral, it demanded undisturbed access to the world’s shipping 
lanes to maintain its trade.2 However, Germany’s submarine warfare campaign sank 
numerous Spanish vessels at a great loss to the economy.3 The new Premier, Conde de 
Romanones, already nurturing a Francophile perspective, utilized this opportunity to 
commence a slow shift to a policy favoring the Entente.  
In February 1915, Germany launched a submarine campaign against merchant 
shipping to reduce Allied supplies, particularly to Britain, to a level that would force 
London out of the war. Over a period of seven months, German submarines sank 787,120 
                                                 
1 Count Romanones as quoted in “Spanish Ex-Premier Declares for Allies,” New York Times, 20 April 
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tons of merchant shipping.4 The Germans suspended the program, however, because the 
tonnage sunk was not worth the detrimental impact the campaign had upon the neutral 
powers, most particularly the United States. Unfortunately for Spain, the halting of the 
campaign was short lived. In the fall of 1916, Germany launched a restricted submarine 
campaign, followed by the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on a much 
larger scale in February 1917. With far more U-boats now in service, between September 
1916 and January 1917, the tonnage sunk was almost double that during the campaign’s 
initial seven months in 1915.5 The campaign’s success then increased during the 
following months. The Germans possessed 105 U-boats, of which approximately one-
third could be at sea at one time (one third received repairs, while the remaining third was 
in transit). The total merchant marine tonnage sunk skyrocketed to 520,410 tons in 
February 1917, 564,500 in March, and 860,330 in April.6 As the tonnage lost rates 
escalated, so did the risk of alienating neutral powers. However, the Germans felt they 
had to assume the risk in an effort to knock Britain out of the war before the United 
States could ship millions of troops to Europe. The submarine campaign ultimately 
resulted in the United States abandoning its neutrality on 6 April 1917, while creating a 
serious crisis for Spain. 
The first stage of the crisis occurred in 1916. The German submarine campaign of 
February 1915 had a tremendous impact on Spain as it drastically hindered its trade and 
exacerbated the severe shortages already being experienced in the country. Both King 
Alfonso and the new Prime Minister, Count Conde de Romanones, protested what they 
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perceived to be an obvious violation of Spain’s neutral rights. During the first week of 
April 1916, tensions deepened even further when the Germans sank the French channel 
steamer, Essex, killing the great Spanish composer Enrique Granados and his wife. Over 
the next several days the German sank two Spanish vessels, the Vigo and Santanderino, 
triggering public outrage. A New York Times article quoted a response from Amadeo 
Hurtado, an authority on international law, who stated, “Spain should take the initiative to 
bring about joint action of all neutral countries, in order to put a stop to the illegal system 
which has such disastrous consequences for all neutrals.”7 Prior to these attacks, King 
Alfonso appeared to switch his position in favor of the Central Powers and absolute 
neutrality. However, he became extremely unnerved by the attacks and loss of life, while 
Romanones expressed outrage, even petitioning the United States to form a joint protest.8 
The Central Powers, realizing that with a pro-Allied Spanish Prime Minister they must 
stay in Alfonso’s good graces to ensure Spain’s neutrality, issued a formal apology on 14 
May 1916.  
However, Germany’s attitude towards Spain changed following a June 1916 
event. The German submarine U-35, presumably responsible for several successful 
attacks on Allied vessels, arrived in Cartagena producing a flurry of protest from London 
and Paris. The newspaper El Imparcial reported that the submarine delivered a note of 
gratitude from Kaiser Wilhelm to King Alfonso because of the favorable treatment of 
German officers who had surrendered to Spanish officials in Guinea after the Cameroons 
in Africa surrendered to the Entente. There were, however, deep suspicions relative to the 
true purpose of the visit. Many believed it was a sign of new peace initiatives between 
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King Alfonso and Kaiser Wilhelm.9 The stern protests and Entente activity placed 
pressure on German-Spanish relations, and those professing pro-Allied tendencies 
worried about the image being portrayed. Fernando León y Castillo, Spanish Ambassador 
to Paris, wrote Prime Minister Romanones, “’What a pity!’ The French just want proof of 
our friendship, and this is the spectacle we are providing.”10 However, a speech by 
Antonio Maura, the former Conservative party leader whose followers included some of 
the most vocal Germanophiles, further strained German-Spanish relations. In a 10 
September 1916 speech, Maura supported Romanones’ stance observing: 
Spain must either take her proper place among the nations or submit to be evicted, degraded, and 
trampled under foot… Spain would be foolish to refuse intimate association with these western 
nations, because she naturally belongs to the same group, and because it is much easier to 
harmonize the interests of Spain with those of England and France than to defend them against 
France and England in alliance with any other nation.”11 
The outcry to the U-35 incident led Germany to believe that Spanish opinion had 
shifted toward the Allied side, and by December 1916, Berlin fully recognized that 
Romanones was the main enemy within Spain. The Central Powers declared they were 
ready to pursue peace terms with the Entente in early December. However, this peace 
would be based on their terms and they even threatened to resume hostilities if the 
Entente rejected the proposition. The Entente, however, refused to accept the Central 
Power’s overtures on the basis that the war had been forced upon them, and they would 
not cater to those who had initiated such a dreadful ordeal. This exchange was followed 
by a note from United States President Woodrow Wilson to all the belligerents and 
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neutrals with the goal of finding some agreement to end the war. Wilson presented Spain 
the opportunity to volunteer its services as an arbiter of peace, the main goal of King 
Alfonso and the government leaders. The Entente powers resented Wilson’s note 
believing that peace on Germany’s terms would mean all its sacrifices had been in vain. 
They clearly indicated that they would not be amenable to such approaches, thus, 
Romanones recognized the detrimental impact Spain’s endorsement of this initiative 
could have on its relations with the Allied powers. As a result, Romanones declined the 
President’s offer and instead protested the sinking of neutral vessels as a direct violation 
of the London Declaration of 1909, which outlined the rights of neutrals. He also stated 
that Spain: 
has always maintained the inadmissibility of the destruction of naval prizes as carried out by the 
German submarines. The Spanish Government has adopted on this subject a more insistent 
attitude than any other neutral, not excluding the United States; and further, it does not admit the 
interpretation given by the Central Empires to international law in the destruction of ships; it has 
always made representations and protests against such an interpretation.12 
At this point, Germany clearly recognized the threat posed by the Romanones 
administration, leading to a dramatic change in Berlin’s attitude toward Spain and a plan 
to destabilize Madrid’s unfriendly government and manipulate the somewhat hostile 
public opinion. The last months of 1916 witnessed extreme contradictions in Germany’s 
actions in Spain. While continuing to appeal to Alfonso to maintain Spain’s neutrality, 
Berlin also inaugurated a harsh propaganda campaign to sway public opinion and topple 
the hostile administration. Their attacks were not limited to propaganda, as submarine 
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attacks and incidents of sabotage and espionage drastically increased after September 
1916. During the first two war years, German submarines sank only eight Spanish ships; 
during just one week in September 1916, they sank three, and the attacks steadily 
worsened after December 1916.  
On 31 January 1917, Germany announced the renewal of its unrestricted 
submarine warfare, which clearly delineated the Mediterranean Sea and waters 
surrounding Britain and France as restricted zones. Although the potential impact on 
Spain was obvious, the declaration did not illicit a strong Spanish protest. Foreign 
Minister Amalio Gimeno expressed dismay over the situation in a letter to German 
Ambassador Max von Ratibor, but never threatened to interrupt diplomatic relations with 
Germany over the campaign’s consequences for Spain. Instead, it decried the policy as 
unnecessary and harmful to Spain, whose neutral rights should be respected and honored. 
The letter asked the German government to understand the economic impact this would 
have upon Spain and the enormous hardhip it would impose upon its population.13 
The Germans proved unsympathetic to the Foreign Minister’s pleas. The 
campaign continued and by April 1917, thirty-three Spanish ships with 80,000 tons 
would be sunk. This placed the Spanish government in a precarious diplomatic position. 
Would they continue to allow themselves to be bullied by the Central Powers, or would 
they sever diplomatic relations with Germany? This predicament accelerated the gulf 
between Francophiles and Germanophiles, as those favoring Germany staunchly 
supported the maintenance of strict neutrality, while those benevolent to the Entente 
believed Spain could not afford acceptance of such German attacks. Francophile Luis 
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Araquistain declared, “The neutrality of Spain depends on German submarines and if 
Germany does not rectify the maritime war, they choose our belligerence,” and 
furthermore that it would be a “defensive war, a war to protect our coasts, our waters, and 
our commerce.”14 On the other hand, the pro-German press inundated Spain with 
propaganda emphasizing what they perceived to be German hospitality. An article in the 
newspaper ABC related: 
Since the beginning of the war, the king, the government, and all of Spain have eloquently 
demonstrated our understanding of our neutrality with hospitality and generosity. The subjects of 
Germany… have met our viewpoints with only consideration and respect.15 
As 1917 progressed, the crisis worsened. The Central Powers drastically increased 
their propaganda campaign against Romanones, while he became even more determined 
to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and move towards the Entente. 
Acknowledging the deep division in Spanish public opinion, Romanones resolved to 
await the right psychological moment to sever ties with Germany. Following Germany’s 
announcement of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, Romanones on 1 
February announced to parliament: 
The decision for the Central Powers to use all possible means to stop all maritime traffic with 
France, Britain, Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean entails grave consequences for Spain. This 
government is resolved that the life of this country must not be disrupted. This government is 
therefore determined to take such steps as may be appropriate in these circumstances.16 
Romanones’ moment of truth came on 9 April 1917. Without prior warning, a 
German submarine torpedoed the San Fulgencio en route to Spain with desperately 
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needed British coal. This provided the last straw for Romanones and the perfect 
opportunity to justify terminating diplomatic relations with Germany. In a letter to 
Spanish Ambassador to France, Fernando León y Castillo he related, “The crucial 
moment has arrived, the sinking of the San Fulgencio has been the final straw. The route 
I will take is already determined in the direction that you know.”17 Romanones believed 
that, diplomatically, Spain could not afford to allow this treatment by the Germans. If 
Spain did not stand up against these attacks, he feared it would mark Spain’s final demise 
into the realm of insignificant European powers. He intended to forward a strongly-
worded note to the German government as a prelude to breaking off relations. However, 
Romanones fully realized the dangerous game he was playing. In his letter to León y 
Castillo, he related “the struggle between the Germanophiles and myself is to the 
death.”18  
Although Romanones was adamant in how Spain should proceed at this point, 
other members of the Cortes and, more importantly, King Alfonso XIII disagreed. They 
refused to accept Romanones’ harsh language for fear of drawing Spain into the conflict. 
The German propaganda campaign aimed against Romanones reached astounding levels, 
even affecting the opinions of governmental members. The Germans threatened the 
ruling elites that if Spain joined the Entente, they may suffer the same fate as the Russian 
ruling class following the revolution. Even the British Ambassador to Spain, Sir Arthur 
Hardinge reported, “It is quite true that the Russian revolution produced an entire change 
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in the King of Spain’s feelings towards the Allies.”19 The situation was exacerbated by 
the fact that Romanones’ policies received overwhelming support from members of the 
left including Socialist leader Pablo Iglesias. Famed writer and intellectual, Miguel de 
Unamuno even directly called for a complete rupture in diplomatic relations with 
Germany and a re-orientation of Spain’s international politics to favor the Entente.20 As 
domestic opinion continued to destabilize, virtually all members of the Spanish 
government demanded the maintenance of strict neutrality. These events forced 
Romanones to resign, but he refused to leave quietly. On 19 April he stated, “The time 
has come when every man of conscience must give his vote and take part in the European 
conflict. In tendering my resignation to the King, I voted for France.”21 
What could have drastically impacted the future of Spain would result in 
diplomatic humiliation and Romanones’ demise. The Entente did not respond to his 
approaches because there was no certainty that Spanish involvement would have any 
effect on the war’s outcome. Thus, Entente members believed the best course for Spain 
would be to remain neutral. This, coupled with Germany’s resolve to ensure Spanish 
neutrality, proved to be insurmountable obstacles for Romanones. Although realizing the 
potential consequences of absolute neutrality, he maintained the minority view. With the 
destructive war continuing without end, the chaos that had emerged in Russia and Spain’s 
own domestic troubles, the government, supported by much of the population, believed 
that intervention in the war was not only undesirable, but also impossible. 
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Chapter Five 
 
A Nation Revolts 
 
The war is a revolution, and here in Spain we must make [a revolution] of our own.1 
 
 While the government wrestled with the most difficult diplomatic crisis of the 
war, it neglected to recognize increasing domestic discontent. The maintenance of 
Spain’s neutrality remained foremost in the politician’s minds because no matter what 
their personal inclinations, they believed involvement was not just undesirable, but 
impossible. While the government acknowledged the fact that Spain was in no position to 
participate in the war, it refused to acknowledge why. The liberal monarchy failed to 
come to grips with the extreme changes occurring in the country. The division of opinion 
over the war paved the way for the rise of mass politics in Spain, but the government 
leaders neglected to identify the emerging triple threat—the working class, the military 
and a political party —whose opposition to the government through 1917 would 
undermine the foundation of power on which the turno so desperately depended.2   
While the government struggled with Spain’s declining international prestige 
resulting from the German unrestricted submarine campaign, internal strife escalated to a 
critical point. The crisis de subsistencias continued to devastate the majority of the 
Spanish population resulting in a storm of protest, and finally culminating in action.3 In 
July 1916, the working class emerged as a formidable opponent to the Liberal Monarchy 
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when two rival workers’ trade unions, the Socialist UGT and the Anarcho-Syndicalist 
CNT, joined forces in an attempt to force the government to address the problems of 
inflation and the crisis de subsistencias. Once united, they issued a manifesto in March 
1917, which attacked the government as the cause of the problems plaguing Spain.  
Is there any Spanish ruler who could affirm that our unbearable living conditions are not the 
consequence of a regime of privileges, of a constant orgy of private ambitions, of an unchecked 
immorality, which finds in our public institutions a shelter which should instead be provided for 
the fundamental interests of the people?... The organized labour movement has therefore 
concluded that it must be united in the common fight against a system of government which 
protects exploitation.4 
While an attack from the country’s working-class parties may not have been a 
great surprise, the crisis de subsistencias produced a protest from an unexpected source. 
The economic hardships had a tremendous effect on the Spanish Army’s officer corps, 
the military middle class. Beginning in mid-1916, officers began organizing into military 
trade unions, the juntas de defensa, to combat corruption in the army and to demand pay 
increases because their buying power had been reduced by inflation. They, as with so 
many others, simply believed they had suffered enough and wanted only to make a 
peaceful pronunciamento.5 Furthermore, they wanted to create a movement that would 
not just represent their own interests, but those of all groups struggling under the current 
system.6 Their original intent was not to overthrow the government or be a major 
participant in Spanish politics. 
With the Bolshevik revolution consuming Russia in early 1917, King Alfonso 
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became increasingly concerned about the rising influence of the juntas de defensa and 
their increasing popularity as a movement to change the existing regime. As a result, 
Alfonso ordered the new War Minister, General Aguilera, to disband them. On 1 June 
1917, the juntas de defensa issued a declaration that announced their refusal to disband 
and acknowledged their revolt against the government: 
The administration has not improved and the Army is absolutely disorganized, despised and 
disregarded in its vital needs: (1) ‘In its moral needs,’ which produces a lack of inner satisfaction 
and stifles enthusiasm; (2) ‘In its professional or technical needs,’ through the absence of military 
knowledge, which there are no means of acquiring, through the lack of unity of doctrine to direct 
it, and the lack of material to carry out its ends; (3) ‘In its economic needs,’ since officers and men 
are treated worse than in any other country and are even worse than civilians in analogous 
circumstance in their own country.7 
 As the laborers and officers protested, the government faced a third attack, this 
one from the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie represented by the Lliga Regionalista and led 
by Francisco de Asís Cambó. The Lliga, while by no means a revolutionary party, 
became leaders in the attempt to establish a coalition opposing the turno. As Spain 
appeared to crumble around them, they realized the necessity of having to realign the 
existing political regime by wresting power from the landed oligarchy that had controlled 
the country for so many years. On 19 July, Francisco Cambó organized a peaceful 
“Assembly of Parliamentarians” in Barcelona where sixty-eight gathered to denounce the 
turno and demand a reorganization of the government to reflect the will of the people. He 
and the Lliga gained significant support because the Republicans and Socialists decided 
to participate in this initiative that, if successful, would prevent a violent insurrection. 
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However, Cambó failed because of his inability to secure the support of Antonio Maura, 
the former leader of the turno and recent advocate of government reform. Maura and his 
followers, the Mauristas, believed in the necessity of a conservative revolution to abolish 
the turno, which they believed had become a sham. The Lliga proposal seemed the 
perfect opportunity for Maura as Cambó, a moderate politician, desired a regeneration of 
conservatism. However, Maura refused to support the Lliga’s motion, while the juntas 
also pursued Maura’s support. Thus, in 1917, Maura had the opportunity to change the 
course of Spanish politics by serving as the link to join these two oppositionist 
movements. In the end, however, despite his complaints against the existing system, 
Maura remained loyal to the monarchy and the Liberal regime and thus would not 
participate in any action that might threaten their power.8 
 In 1917, the country hovered on the brink of domestic chaos, compelling many to 
question the leadership that had brought them to this position. It was a year of diplomatic 
turning points as well with the German submarine crisis humiliating Spain and 
reaffirming the belief that Madrid still represented an insignificant continental power. 
Socialist journalist Luis Araquistain related, “Awakened by the war, fueled by the 
Russian Revolution and the lessons of Greece, the spirit of renewal has exploded in 
Spanish life.”9 However, despite these threats, the government obviously remained 
resolute in maintaining its power. 
But it was not meant to be. It became increasingly apparent that the government 
could no longer continue its present oligarchical system. When Romanones resigned, his 
                                                 
8 Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Twentieth-Century Spain: Politics and Society in Spain, 1898-1998 (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 36-37. 
9 Araquistain, Entre la guerra y la revolucion, 119. 
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Liberal rival, Marquis of Alhucemas became Prime Minister. The Marquis attempted to 
resolve some of the Romanones administration’s problems, but it proved to be too little, 
too late. His government, which lasted only fifty-three days, failed because of his 
inability to resolve the juntas crisis. Eduardo Dato, who fell from power in December 
1915, replaced Alhucemas, but appointed almost the same Cabinet that proved unable to 
handle the diplomatic and domestic concerns two years earlier. His return resulted in 
outrage from all the groups excluded from the turno.  
In an attempt to neutralize the growing domestic crisis and the emerging threat 
against the regime, Dato’s Cabinet developed a strategy designed to quell both the danger 
of Spain’s unified working class and the rising popularity of the juntas. Dato hoped to 
capitalize on bourgeois fears stemming from revolutionary activity in Russia by forcing 
the workers into launching a general strike. He believed that the workers would be unable 
to plan and organize in advance; therefore, such a strike could be easily quelled. He also 
intended to implicate the officers in the strike’s repression to provide the government the 
opportunity to become the “saviour of social order.”10  
Dato’s opportunity arose during a transport strike that began in Valencia on 19 
July between workers and the railroad company, Compañía del Norte. The dispute 
developed into a violent confrontation that halted seventy percent of Valencia’s transport. 
As events stabilized, the Compañía del Norte refused to re-hire several workers fired 
during the conflict. The UGT and PSOE reacted by issuing an ultimatum that they would 
launch a general strike if the company did not re-hire the workers. The Compañía del 
Norte refused and a strike commenced on 13 August. Those on the left immediately came 
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to the defense of the struggling workers. The leftist periodical España encouraged, “The 
Spanish rail workers are not alone in this struggle… this mobilization of the proletariat 
cannot stop until it is sufficient enough to guarantee the regime change necessary to save 
the dignity and decorum of our national life.”11 However, not all were so sympathetic. An 
article in El Debate called the strike a “seditious, antipatriotic, revolutionary, antisocial 
work of a turbulent minority.”12 Exactly as Dato anticipated, the strike failed. Successful 
in limited areas, the army violently suppressed the revolt. Evidence strongly suggests that 
this was not the Socialists’ preferred course of action, but that the situation was forced 
upon them. Daniel Anguiano, a member of the strike committee and President of the 
Railway Trade Union asked: 
Who could benefit from a strike then? ...We did not want it… We were prepared to accept all 
kinds of compromises… We intended to avoid it until the last moment… but Dato wanted to 
discredit the labour movement and to justify the repression of a general strike which he himself 
was provoking so as to consolidate his position in power, obtain a decree of dissolution of Cortes 
and maintain the fiction of the Turno.13 
 Although the strike failed as planned, Dato’s hopes of changing the population’s 
perceptions of the government were dashed. The crushing of the workers’ parties did 
nothing to address the severe domestic issues plaguing the country, German submarines 
still wreaked havoc on Spanish shipping, and most of the social and political forces in 
Spain came to despise the government. Although Dato intended to link this perceived 
revolution to the Assembly of Parliamentarians, he failed, and the government settled into 
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an extremely perilous situation. 
Further complicating matters was the juntas’ loss of popularity due to their brutal 
crushing of the August strike. The juntas realized that Dato had forced them to repress a 
strike provoked by his government and now decided to assume a more active role in 
destroying the political corruption that had permeated Spain for so long. The situation 
came to a head on 26 October when the juntas delivered an ultimatum to the king, 
demanding that he create a national government that respected the popular vote. This 
ultimatum led to the demise of Dato and end of the turno as it had previously existed. 
After a record eight days without a government, King Alfonso established a new Cabinet 
with the Marquis of Alhucemas again as Prime Minister. Although the turno still 
maintained a majority within the administration, these events proved to be a turning point 
for them.  
Increasing divisions and growing opposition plagued a government that for so 
long had not been challenged. The dynastic parties never again enjoyed the hegemonic 
control they once held as the war brought increasing political awareness to a previously 
apathetic population. As Luis Arquistain warned, “A government that attempts to 
suffocate public opinion goes the way of political suicide and historic failure.”14 While 
the country could revel somewhat in the fact that the turno had been overthrown, the 
devastating failure of the August strike crushed any hopes of democracy becoming a 
reality for Spain. Political strife only increased and although the dynastic elites’ power 
had been checked, internal divisions and rival factions among the other political parties 
created an atmosphere of instability.  
                                                 
14 Araquistain, Entre la guerra y la revolucion, 145-146. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The End of an Empire 
 
“’Fatal Neutralities’ was not only an editorial, but is becoming a prophecy and if God 
does not protect us it could become a catastrophe.”1 
 
 While domestic crisis enveloped the country, diplomatically, Spain’s position 
continued to deteriorate even at the war’s end. Between 1918 and 1923, Spain’s status as 
a continental power diminished further as it dealt with the consequences of its neutrality 
policy. In the latter months of the war, Germany’s submarine campaign persisted 
unabated. Even when this threat finally ended with the November 1918 armistice, Spain’s 
troubles continued. As the peace negotiations commenced, it became evident that King 
Alfonso and the government’s ambitions for Spain’s postwar role would not come to 
fruition. Instead, Spain was forced to come to terms with the bitter consequences of its 
four-year neutrality policy. 
 Even after ousting the pro-Allied Prime Minister Conde de Romanones from 
power in April 1917, Germany remained unrelenting in its submarine campaign believing 
that Spain still favored the Entente. Following the signing of the March 1918 Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, which ended Russia’s participation in the war, Germany launched its 
major Spring 1918 Western front offensive, expanding its attack against Spanish 
merchant ships, much to the dismay of the Spanish people. In a poem entitled, “La guerra 
submarina,” poet Goy de Silva lamented, “the waters are always restless, dancing 
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eternally while death prowls at the bottom of the sea.”2 An article in the newspaper, 
España Nueva, lashed out more directly against these attacks and encouraged the 
government to act. “We believe the government must hurry to formulate a response of 
protest to Germany as this constitutes a violation of the rights of Spanish citizens to trade 
with whomever they please.”3   
The government, however, proved unwilling to challenge Germany. The 
Germanophile newspaper, ABC, quoted Antonio Maura as saying, “nothing we have 
suffered justifies rupturing relations.”4 Such unwillingness was met by great opposition 
from the Spanish populace, as demonstrated in writer and intellectual Miguel de 
Unamuno’s reply to Maura’s speech: “In 1898, the tragic year for the regency, they 
sacrificed the dignity of the country for dynastic interests. Today, we do not know what 
dark interests or evils they want to sacrifice.”5 Even Britain and France expressed outrage 
over Spanish losses, urging Spain to demand that the German government replace ships 
lost to submarines. But neither domestic opposition nor Entente encouragement could 
convince Spain to take a stand against the German threat. Madrid feigned negotiations 
and as an article in Diario Universal reported, “While Spain negotiates, Germany sinks 
our ships.”6  
 Thus, the Spanish government found itself in the same position as in early 1917, 
as German attacks flourished and Madrid had to decide how much more they would 
tolerate. In March 1918, King Alfonso appeared to have finally formed a government that 
                                                 
2 Goy de Silva, “La guerra submarina,” in Fernando Diaz-Plaja, España, los años decisivos: 1917, 115. 
3 España Nueva, 31 January 1918, in Algunos datos sobre la guerra submarina, 35-36. 
4 ABC, 4 April 1917, in Fernando Diaz-Plaja, La historia de España en sus documentos: el siglo XX 
(Madrid: 1960), 350. 
5 El Liberal, 27 May 1917, in Diaz-Plaja, La historia de España en sus documentos: el siglo XX, 352. 
6 Diario Universal, 22 February 1918, in Algunos datos sobre la guerra submarina, 38. 
 
 57
could assist Spain in its continued trouble as the Ministerio de Primates (Cabinet of 
Titans) assumed power. Headed by former Prime Minister Antonio Maura, it included 
two other previous turno leaders, Eduardo Dato and Conde de Romanones, as well as a 
group of Spain’s most experienced and dynamic politicians. Had Spain finally found the 
leadership necessary to restore its national honor? 
 Despite the apparent strength of the new regime, it proved just as incapable as the 
previous governments in neutralizing the German threat, which had now expanded its 
disturbances within Spanish borders. In early 1918, several Spanish newspapers reported 
extensive German espionage being conducted in Spain and revealed Germany funded 
anarchists wreaking havoc within the country. Rather than address these subversive 
activities, the Cabinet of Titans revealed their impotence by passing a law of espionage in 
July, which essentially silenced the Spanish press.7 The law forbade the press from 
reporting on news that related to the Spanish neutrality policy, while also forbidding all 
negative representations of diplomats or political leaders. In addition, it restricted the 
“spreading of news of a nature to alarm Spaniards.”8 
 As German attacks continued, events finally came to a head during an incident 
that forced the government to realize that the situation was spiraling out of control. On 13 
July, the Germans torpedoed the Spanish ship Ramón de Larriñaga, carrying oil from 
New York, as it entered Spanish waters even machine-gunning its sailors after they 
abandoned ship. Maura finally responded with outrage stating, “The limits of Spanish 
patience have been reached… This last example of contempt and brutality will have to be 
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solved by the government without further delays.”9 At last, it appeared that the Spanish 
government would stand up against the German violation of its neutral rights. The 
government warned Germany on 10 August that if they sank any further Spanish vessels, 
any tonnage lost would be replaced by German and Austro-Hungarian ships which had 
sought refuge in Spanish ports at the war’s outbreak. However, Spanish expectations 
were completely dashed, as Germany replied that any seizure of its ships would be 
considered an act of war. Germany then continued to torpedo five more Spanish vessels 
the following month.  
 In summer 1918, the Spanish government once again had to decide if they would 
halt German bullying. Spain’s leaders buckled and again cowered to German wishes. 
Spain did not achieve a diplomatic victory as hoped by Maura and his Cabinet. Rather 
than seizing German vessels in port, the Spanish government was forced to accept a 
German agreement to loan ships to Spain only after Germany decided which ones to loan. 
Thus, the Germans completely humiliated the Spanish as the war turned to the Entente’s 
favor. 
When the armistice was ratified in November 1918, and Conde de Romanones 
again became Prime Minister in December, Spaniards retained the hope that their country 
could play a role in the new European political arena. After the United States entered the 
war in April 1917, King Alfonso, seeing himself as the leader of the neutral nations, 
stated that as, “the sole remaining neutral nation of influence and power,” Spain should 
lead the rest of Europe to peace.10 However, the Entente rebuffed Alfonso’s claim. A 
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letter from the head of the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador to Spain 
described a recent discussion with the Spanish Ambassador and responded to the Spanish 
Ambassador’s claims: 
I listened to this enumeration with some surprise, and, indeed, felt some difficulty in reconciling 
the general arguments of his Excellency with my own recollection of the events of the past four 
years. I refrained, however, from casting any doubt upon his presentation of history, and contented 
myself with remarking that, if the Allies had profited by what they had obtained from Spain, Spain 
herself had been a much greater gainer by the transaction. She has escaped the ravages of war…. 
So far as my information went, there was no other European country that had suffered less from 
the war than Spain.11 
Thus, the war not only failed to improve Spain’s European position, it emphasized its 
status as a secondary continental power not even worthy of an invitation to the peace 
negotiations.  
 As if Spain’s failed attempts to participate in the peace negotiations were not 
humiliating enough, France punished Madrid for the Germanophile stance of many of its 
key institutions. Following the war, Spain was embroiled in an unpopular and 
underfunded campaign in Morocco. Given the army’s weakened condition, Spain was no 
match for the well-armed and well-trained Moroccan Moorish guerillas. Paris, however, 
did not come to Spain’s aid. The result was the disaster at Annual in summer 1921, where 
more than 12,000 Spanish troops died, while the Moors overran most of the eastern 
Moroccan Protectorate.12 Morocco, the territory Spain had been desperate to maintain 
and expand during the war, not only created an unsolvable problem with France, but also 
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led to insurmountable problems with the indigenous population.13 This postwar 
Moroccan crisis, much like the 1898 Spanish-American War disaster and Spanish 
impotence against the German submarine campaign, added to Spain’s international 
humiliation and guaranteed that it would remain a secondary country in European 
politics. 
 As the war ended and the European nations attempted to bring peace to the 
ravaged continent, Spain found itself isolated. Germany had successfully embarrassed the 
formerly great empire and Spain had to accept its second-rate status. Romanones would 
later relate how neutrality “had a devastating effect in diminishing the international 
prestige of Spain” and “interrupted, if not destroyed, its work in international politics.”14 
In addition, domestic discontent continued to ravage the country, as the government 
ultimately proved unable to create internal stability. Following numerous attempts to 
establish a government that would address the country’s increasing problems, these 
regimes rose and fell until September 1923 when General Miguel Primo de Rivera’s 
military dictatorship filled the long-standing political vacuum. 
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Conclusion 
 
The world in war and in peace, Spain is alone.1 
 
 When the European war broke out in 1914 and Spain immediately declared 
neutrality, the population felt optimistic about their nation’s future. Realizing the country 
was in an unfavorable position militarily and economically, most Spaniards favored 
neutrality as the wisest course of action. They also believed that it offered the long-
sought opportunity for Spain to regain its position as a major continental player. 
However, despite these high hopes, Spanish neutrality failed to yield such positive 
consequences. 
While certainly not prepared to enter the war, the conflagration nevertheless 
affected Spain with devastating results. The government proved completely unprepared 
to address the domestic crises that materialized, particularly food shortages and inflation. 
The inability to resolve these issues, exacerbated by the intensifying divisions between 
Francophiles and Germanophiles, led to the emergence of a civil war of words. A country 
once consumed by apathy became filled with outrage. Individuals who had never 
participated in politics now chose a side in the conflict, seeking to save their country from 
further hardship. This, however, created further discontent, revolution, and the fall of 
numerous governments. Between 1918 and 1923, twelve governments and three 
parliaments failed to overcome the social instability. Each government proved either 
unable or unwilling to address the demands of the new politically conscious society, and 
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the various political groups could not provide an organized, effective replacement 
government. “It was anarchy that led nowhere, more terrible than the anarchy of 
revolutions, because the instinct for self-preservation which breeds revolutions seemed to 
have died in Spanish society.”2 
 As Spain wrestled with these domestic crises, its diplomatic efforts also failed. 
The Spanish government’s unwillingness to join either alliance left them completely 
isolated at the war’s end. King Alfono’s desire to serve as the leader of the peace 
negotiations proved unrealistic, as Spain even failed to receive even an invitation to the 
Versailles conference. It had been completely humiliated by German actions, furthering 
the widely-held belief that Spain was barely a second-rate continental power. 
However, while the negative consequences of Spanish neutrality appear obvious, 
would intervention have yielded more positive results? At the outbreak of the war, Spain 
was in no position to participate in a major military conflict on the continent. Militarily 
unprepared, economically backward and diplomatically isolated, the government realized 
that involvement was impossible, and Spain’s problems only worsened throughout the 
war. Although leaders, such as Conde de Romanones, desired intervention, the 
government’s general stance was that intervention would prove disastrous because of the 
serious potential for the outbreak of a civil war in the divided country. If Spain joined the 
Entente, German enmity would result. Considering the impact of Germany’s submarine 
campaign upon Spain, it could face maritime disaster if it intervened in the conflict. 
Germany, recognizing Spain’s endemic instability, would surely have created further 
chaos, particularly because of the incredibly strong Germanophile presence in the 
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country. Germany controlled much of the Spanish press, while also maintaining a 
significant covert force for espionage and sabotage. Thus, Germany could easily wreak 
havoc if Spain opted to join the Entente. On the other hand, had Spain joined the Central 
Powers, Britain and France, because of their geographic location, could have easily 
inflicted similar damage upon the Spanish. So, as Italy, Romania and other nations 
abandoned neutrality in favor of intervention, Spain remained firm in its diplomatic 
position. Despite all the negative consequences of neutrality, it remained the only option 
given Spain’s extreme instability.  
The impact of the First World War upon the belligerent powers is obvious, but 
one must not ignore its impact on neutral powers. Spain suffered tremendously between 
1914 and 1918. Although, in general, the government and population remained optimistic 
that neutrality would prove beneficial to the nation, it was in vain. Spain faced a tragic 
situation as either neutrality or intervention would have produced terrible consequences. 
The government chose what it anticipated to be the lesser of two evils and while this 
option proved costly, the alternative could have been even more devastating. Although 
Spain did not emerge from the war with increased prestige and diplomatic standing in 
Europe, as many had hoped, the outcome could have been even bleaker than the reality 
had it intervened. The belief that neutrality would enhance its status as a Great Power 
proved false and the Spanish Empire ceased to have any influence. Even more powerless 
and divided, Spain emerged from the war a mere shadow of its former self. 
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